…the Army’s Future Force, configured around the FCS, will likely be deployable only against an A2/AD [anti-access area denial] threat that has already been defeated by air and maritime forces. Those same forces, however, could locate, track, and destroy enemy ground forces operating in the open, which would likely compel the enemy to move into restricted terrain (e.g., urban areas) and employ irregular warfare tactics, for which the FCS is poorly suited.Heller could write a 21st Century Catch-22 about this logic.
During the major combat operations phase of the conflict, Army forces would likely need to engage in protracted security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. On the other hand, if the Air Force cannot stage out of forward air bases and if the Navy is forced to operate outside the littoral, it is difficult to see how an enemy’s A2/AD system could quickly be degraded to the point where significant Army forces could be introduced quickly and at acceptable cost. Simply stated, solving the A2/AD challenge enables the Future Force – while marginalizing it at the same time.To sum up: the Future Force could not deploy to a theater until the mission for which it had optimzed had become irrelevent.
This is all overcome by events, but still important for the exercise in clear strategic thinking it provides.
