What strikes me about this idea is not so much whether [hybid war] is right. Clearly, there are interesting combinations taking shape - Hizballa fighting in a more semi-conventional fashion than expected, or North Korea re-asserting the importance of Special Forces, as David shows.I’ve had similar thoughts about asymmetric warfare, essentially in line with Barnett’s quip about it being a fancy way of saying “the other guy isn’t stupid.” If asymmetric or hybrid warfare shocks someone, then what form of warfare did they expect? The American-preferred enemy strategy?
Instead, it is the surprise or shock registered when the enemy adopts a different defence posture than expected.
I find myself repeatedly returning to the conclusion that clear perception and adaptability ought to be our focus. No matter what we do, we’re going to face intelligence adversaries who will examine and attack our approach. For me, the most striking aspect of Matthew’s study of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war was Hezbollah’s detailed preparation. They truly studied the IDF and tailored themselves to flummox it. In contrast to this focused study, Matthews described an IDF complacent about the Hezbollah’s capabilities in the summer of 2006. The manner in which Hezbollah exploited this complacency may be novel (and therefore characterized as “hybrid” or “asymmetric”) but the macro dynamics match those of competition throughout human experience: people adapt. Something is very wrong if we implicitly expect our enemies to adopt a non-adaptive defensive posture.
