insightful strategic choices refer to devising courses of action likely to achieve one’s ultimate goals despite resource constraints, political considerations, bureaucratic resistance, the adversary’s opposing efforts, and the intractable un-certainties as to how a chosen strategy may ultimately work out.It is a powerhouse article that makes connections to cognitive science and psychology. Apparently he’s working on a longer study about this at CSBA; I can’t wait to see it. We need to think big about how we’re going to tackle this meta-problem (thinking about how to identify the right thinkers).
Monday, March 30, 2009
Econ Warfare Sim
21st Century Opposed Systems Design
Barry Watts expands on his earlier comment over at DoD Buzz about our lack of skill in making clear strategic choices. He defines those as:
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Fancy ways of saying our opponents aren’t dumb
A post over at KoW articulates a question that has been rattling around in my mind for a while: to what extent is hybrid war a coherent type of warfare and to what extent is it simply a label for describing enemies that refuse to follow our preferred strategies? Porter seems to lean towards the latter:
What strikes me about this idea is not so much whether [hybid war] is right. Clearly, there are interesting combinations taking shape - Hizballa fighting in a more semi-conventional fashion than expected, or North Korea re-asserting the importance of Special Forces, as David shows.I’ve had similar thoughts about asymmetric warfare, essentially in line with Barnett’s quip about it being a fancy way of saying “the other guy isn’t stupid.” If asymmetric or hybrid warfare shocks someone, then what form of warfare did they expect? The American-preferred enemy strategy?
Instead, it is the surprise or shock registered when the enemy adopts a different defence posture than expected.
I find myself repeatedly returning to the conclusion that clear perception and adaptability ought to be our focus. No matter what we do, we’re going to face intelligence adversaries who will examine and attack our approach. For me, the most striking aspect of Matthew’s study of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war was Hezbollah’s detailed preparation. They truly studied the IDF and tailored themselves to flummox it. In contrast to this focused study, Matthews described an IDF complacent about the Hezbollah’s capabilities in the summer of 2006. The manner in which Hezbollah exploited this complacency may be novel (and therefore characterized as “hybrid” or “asymmetric”) but the macro dynamics match those of competition throughout human experience: people adapt. Something is very wrong if we implicitly expect our enemies to adopt a non-adaptive defensive posture.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
If we only had a brain
This identifies the key challenge we face in Defense budgeting: we’ve been so used to having growing budgets that the process of making wise strategic choices has atrophied.
Barry Watts, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment and former head of PA and E, said part of the reason the US faces these grim choices — beyond the onerous financial situation — is that the nation has lost the capacity to make clear and effective strategic choices.The whole article is worth your time.
While we struggle with the immediate challenges before us, we ought to think about how to grow strategic thinkers for the future to rebuild our capacity to make clear and effective strategic choices.