Friday, September 12, 2014
Airstrikes are like casual sex?
This click-baiting headline from Michael Hayden's CNN interview sparked a hilarious twitter thread. Dan Byman chimed in to credit Eliot Cohen with coming up with the line.
The punchline - both airstrikes and casual sex seem like gratification without commitment - doesn't live up to the titillating lead-in. As a rhetorical device, the simile does a poor job of making a serious point about the use of military power. When deciding to use force, national leaders should not gravitate to the comparatively easy tool of airstrikes before they've thought through how the application of force will help them achieve the nation's goals. That's an important point. Does the simile help convey it? No. Furthermore, by muddying the water with this bawdy simile opens the speaker up to any number of snappy comebacks that obscure rather than illuminate the issue:
The punchline - both airstrikes and casual sex seem like gratification without commitment - doesn't live up to the titillating lead-in. As a rhetorical device, the simile does a poor job of making a serious point about the use of military power. When deciding to use force, national leaders should not gravitate to the comparatively easy tool of airstrikes before they've thought through how the application of force will help them achieve the nation's goals. That's an important point. Does the simile help convey it? No. Furthermore, by muddying the water with this bawdy simile opens the speaker up to any number of snappy comebacks that obscure rather than illuminate the issue:
- Given the pop sociology hand-wringing about the popularity of casual sex among millennials, the simile has a high risk of backfiring. "Airstrikes are like causal sex? Awesome! I was looking for a way to fit military action into my busy schedule."
- A quick SECDEF order that all pilots wear their Class A uniforms during airstrikes could clear up the concern about the airstrikes being "casual."
- It opens the speaker up to the question: "Wait, I know you're a national security expert, but how much experience do you have with casual sex?"
- "Oh, I thought you were going to say 'they are both phases a person goes through during college.'"
- "But my parents met during an airstrike!"
- "You're right, airstrikes should only be used between two countries in a long-term, committed relationship."
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
A Content-Free Reference to Go
As strategist and a student of the game of 'Go,' I am always intrigued to see references to the game - particularly when in the context of East Asian geopolitics.
I am often disappointed. Sadly, Boorman's The Protracted Game and Lai's "Learning from the Stones" [pdf] are the exception, not the rule. Most authors who cite Go when talking about East Asian geopolitics simply invoke it and then don't say anything of substance about it.
Such is the case with a recent article by Jin Kai in the Diplomat: A Game of Go: China and Japan Seek Advantages in East Asia. Besides Kai's title, he makes a single reference to go, saying that: “If we look at East Asia’s political map as a Go game board, China and Japan are rival players running into a deadlock, both holding their strategically important game pieces.” There is no insight specific to Go contained in Kai’s article. He mentions it and then goes on to characterize the geopolitical situation in terms that could be interpreted with equal validity using chess, or checkers for that matter.
Kai's superficial reference to Go galls me in particular because his article focuses on the "three main game pieces" that Japan and China each bring to bear in their competition. This is simply inappropriate for an article that supposedly looks at "East Asia's political map as a Go game board." Each stone is identical in Go; there are no different types of game pieces in Go. Stones derive power due to their proximity to friendly stones, which is why Go players study groups. Kai's framework of focusing on different types of game pieces is actually analogous to chess, not Go. I'd expect an article that claims to use the lens of Go to interpret East Asian geopolitics to at least get these elementary facts correct. When it doesn't, it makes the reference to Go meaningless.
I am often disappointed. Sadly, Boorman's The Protracted Game and Lai's "Learning from the Stones" [pdf] are the exception, not the rule. Most authors who cite Go when talking about East Asian geopolitics simply invoke it and then don't say anything of substance about it.
Such is the case with a recent article by Jin Kai in the Diplomat: A Game of Go: China and Japan Seek Advantages in East Asia. Besides Kai's title, he makes a single reference to go, saying that: “If we look at East Asia’s political map as a Go game board, China and Japan are rival players running into a deadlock, both holding their strategically important game pieces.” There is no insight specific to Go contained in Kai’s article. He mentions it and then goes on to characterize the geopolitical situation in terms that could be interpreted with equal validity using chess, or checkers for that matter.
Kai's superficial reference to Go galls me in particular because his article focuses on the "three main game pieces" that Japan and China each bring to bear in their competition. This is simply inappropriate for an article that supposedly looks at "East Asia's political map as a Go game board." Each stone is identical in Go; there are no different types of game pieces in Go. Stones derive power due to their proximity to friendly stones, which is why Go players study groups. Kai's framework of focusing on different types of game pieces is actually analogous to chess, not Go. I'd expect an article that claims to use the lens of Go to interpret East Asian geopolitics to at least get these elementary facts correct. When it doesn't, it makes the reference to Go meaningless.
Tuesday, September 24, 2013
Is China smarter than the U.S.?
That is essentially the question Chet asks:
I've written a great deal about the fallibility of Chinese leaders, and, by extension, the limits of the Chinese system. But, as is often the case, the real focus of Chet's argument about Chinese acumen is American shortcomings, not Chinese brilliance. Often, op-eds use China as a measuring stick to highlight American shortcomings that the author wishes to see fixed (Friedman is famous for this).
This can be a useful rhetorical device, but it has three major limitations.
First, it can blind us to the very real challenges China faces. For example, Michael Pettis argues that China needs to seriously re-balance in order to sustain growth over the long term, and that re-balancing requires growth to slow. From that perspective, the recent bump in the PMI is a bad thing because it is a step away from moderating growth rates, which are necessary to re-balance in an orderly manner. High growth rates in the short-term, therefore, are counter-intuitively a bad sign for long-term growth since they likely perpetuate the export and investment-led model from which China is trying to wean itself. I worry that excessive use of China as a motivating factor for adapting American domestic policy will undermine our ability to rationally understand China on its own terms, with all of its strengths and weaknesses.
Second, the rhetorical device of invoking China's superiority has another risk: it could cause us to lose focus on what we need to fix if China stumbles. If China experiences an economic setback over the next few years, then we'll likely see many people criticizing its leaders for not managing its economy better. If that happens, the U.S. would look better relative to China, but the challenges faced in American domestic politics wouldn't have gone away. I worry that too much use of China as our measuring stick could lead to complacency if China faces a setback.
Finally, using China as a point of comparison can lead some to seek to emulate China's autocratic system in the drive to emulate China's economic growth rates (Chet's post doesn't do this, but others do). America has challenges to overcome, but thinking that we need to become more authoritarian to overcome them is a misdiagnosis.
On the one hand, the China organism would appear to be engaging in various self-improvement exercises, while the US organism spends most of its energy running up and down the street barking at cars, knocking small children off bikes, and chasing its ideological tail.
I've written a great deal about the fallibility of Chinese leaders, and, by extension, the limits of the Chinese system. But, as is often the case, the real focus of Chet's argument about Chinese acumen is American shortcomings, not Chinese brilliance. Often, op-eds use China as a measuring stick to highlight American shortcomings that the author wishes to see fixed (Friedman is famous for this).
This can be a useful rhetorical device, but it has three major limitations.
First, it can blind us to the very real challenges China faces. For example, Michael Pettis argues that China needs to seriously re-balance in order to sustain growth over the long term, and that re-balancing requires growth to slow. From that perspective, the recent bump in the PMI is a bad thing because it is a step away from moderating growth rates, which are necessary to re-balance in an orderly manner. High growth rates in the short-term, therefore, are counter-intuitively a bad sign for long-term growth since they likely perpetuate the export and investment-led model from which China is trying to wean itself. I worry that excessive use of China as a motivating factor for adapting American domestic policy will undermine our ability to rationally understand China on its own terms, with all of its strengths and weaknesses.
Second, the rhetorical device of invoking China's superiority has another risk: it could cause us to lose focus on what we need to fix if China stumbles. If China experiences an economic setback over the next few years, then we'll likely see many people criticizing its leaders for not managing its economy better. If that happens, the U.S. would look better relative to China, but the challenges faced in American domestic politics wouldn't have gone away. I worry that too much use of China as our measuring stick could lead to complacency if China faces a setback.
Finally, using China as a point of comparison can lead some to seek to emulate China's autocratic system in the drive to emulate China's economic growth rates (Chet's post doesn't do this, but others do). America has challenges to overcome, but thinking that we need to become more authoritarian to overcome them is a misdiagnosis.
Thursday, May 23, 2013
What if required reforms are taboo?
The most recent newsletter from Michael Pettis focuses on two competing perspectives on the optimal level of investment for a country. The first perspective holds that there is a global optimal level that advanced economies have developed and that all countries below that level of investment can profitably expand their investment. The second perspective contends that the optimal level of investment for a country depends upon its institutions (what Pettis calls "social capital"), which affect how much investment a country can profitably absorb. Pettis acknowledges that there is not decisive evidence to resolve the debate but he leans towards the latter camp. If one buys this perspective, then in order to continue growth China will have to make painful reforms to its institutions to increase its ability to productively use infrastructure. The necessary reforms include, among other changes, improved rule of law and a reduced influence of crony networks.
If this perspective is correct, then it is ominous that there are reports that Chinese officials have asked professors to avoid seven sensitive topics, including "elite cronyism, and an independent judiciary." If the government is so sensitive about these topics, then how realistic is the expectation that it will tackle them head-on in reforms needed to continue to the healthy growth of China? What happens if the interests of the Communist Party collide with the reforms necessary to enable continued robust growth?
If this perspective is correct, then it is ominous that there are reports that Chinese officials have asked professors to avoid seven sensitive topics, including "elite cronyism, and an independent judiciary." If the government is so sensitive about these topics, then how realistic is the expectation that it will tackle them head-on in reforms needed to continue to the healthy growth of China? What happens if the interests of the Communist Party collide with the reforms necessary to enable continued robust growth?
Friday, April 19, 2013
Stop Lumping Iran in with China
A perfectly serviceable Bloomberg article about the DF-21D makes a misstep in its final sentence:
Regarding ASCMs, The 2013 IISS Military Balance lists Iran has having C-701, C-704, C-802A with ranges of 20 km, 35 km and 180 km, respectively. So, again, even if we grant the Iranians the ability to target and launch these systems at maximum range, a CSG could still stand-off outside their range and still be able to generate sorties over the Iranian mainland.
Iran is not in China's league. Every time an article mention them in the same breath as China, they get a little free prestige boost. Cut it out.
Analysts including Mark Gunzinger, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and some naval officers worry that the new carriers, while formidable warships, may not be able to get close enough for their planes to attack enemies, such as China and Iran, that are armed with precision- guided anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles.Regarding precision ballistic missiles, Iran's attempts to turn the Fateh-110 into an ASBM seem to my eyes to be an Iranian PSYOP to ride on the Chinese coattails. Setting aside the difference in guidance between it and the DF-21D, there is the big issue of range. The Fateh-110 has a 300 km range while the DF-21D has a range in excess of 1,500 km. In other words, even if the Fateh-110 was a real system that could credibly threaten a CSG (and, to repeat, I question that conclusion), then the carrier could safely stand off outside of its range and still generate sorties.
Regarding ASCMs, The 2013 IISS Military Balance lists Iran has having C-701, C-704, C-802A with ranges of 20 km, 35 km and 180 km, respectively. So, again, even if we grant the Iranians the ability to target and launch these systems at maximum range, a CSG could still stand-off outside their range and still be able to generate sorties over the Iranian mainland.
Iran is not in China's league. Every time an article mention them in the same breath as China, they get a little free prestige boost. Cut it out.
Monday, February 25, 2013
PRC, D.C. and the Myth of Scheming
Ezra Klein has a strong blog post regarding a fallacy he sees embedded in the Chinese hacking every organization under the sun in the District. The Chinese are looking for the "Master Key," he argues, because in China even the products of nominally independent think tanks are really secretly the work of government officials.
Klein argues that it is folly to attempt to find such connections between the power brokers and think tank products:
[As an aside, one of my pet peeves is the invocation of go by a threat inflator or other proponent of the argument that the strategically brilliant Chinese are playing an indescribably long game. I'm no dan, but I am more than a beginner (I played around 15 kyu when I had time to devote to the practice) and that is more than enough knowledge to dismiss nearly every analogy using go as incoherent or laughably simplistic as to be useless. The two exceptions that I can think of are David Lai's Learning from the Stones [pdf] and of course Scott Boorman's The Protracted Game.]
Klein argues that it is folly to attempt to find such connections between the power brokers and think tank products:
This is the most pervasive of of all Washington legends: that politicians in Washington are ceaselessly, ruthlessly, effectively scheming. That everything that happens fits into somebody’s plan. It doesn’t. Maybe it started out with a scheme, but soon enough everyone is, at best, reacting, and at worst, failing to react, and always, always they’re doing it with less information than they need.It is akin to the fallacy behind conspiracy theories - complex or unusual events don't necessarily require complex or unusual explanations. Pardon the crassness, but people are flawed, they bumble and shit happens. Klein argues that it is actually a hidden strength of the DC method:
That’s been a key lesson I’ve learned working as a reporter and political observer in Washington: No one can carry out complicated plans. All parties and groups are fractious and bumbling. But everyone always thinks everyone else is efficiently and ruthlessly implementing long-term schemes.
They’re missing our real strength, the real reason Washington fails day-to-day but has worked over years: It’s because we don’t stick too rigidly to plans or rely on some grand design. That way, when it all falls apart, as it always does and always will, we’re okay.All of this reminded me of Luttwak's recently released The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy. Luttwak argues that the purported strategic wisdom of Chinese history actually impedes China's ability to successfully carry out policy in the international sphere. During the waring states period, massive intrigue and Game-of-Thrones-esque maneuvering was possible because of a common language, in addition to ethnic and cultural homogeneity. International politics, on the other hand, is marked by disparate languages, ethnic groups and cultural heritages. In this hodge-podge, deep stratagems aren't feasible because people have a hard enough time understanding one another when they aren't attempting to dissemble. In short, the fear of inscrutable Chinese strategists playing a brilliant long con on the world is simply not plausible because it would require a degree of cosmopolitan understanding of other nations and societies that no nation has successfully achieved.
[As an aside, one of my pet peeves is the invocation of go by a threat inflator or other proponent of the argument that the strategically brilliant Chinese are playing an indescribably long game. I'm no dan, but I am more than a beginner (I played around 15 kyu when I had time to devote to the practice) and that is more than enough knowledge to dismiss nearly every analogy using go as incoherent or laughably simplistic as to be useless. The two exceptions that I can think of are David Lai's Learning from the Stones [pdf] and of course Scott Boorman's The Protracted Game.]
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
Patriots inside Texans OODA loop
The Boston Herald sports page offered an excellent case study in using tempo as a strategic advantage. You should read the whole thing. It describes how the Patriots use a quick, no-huddle offense to operate inside of their opponent's OODA loop. [For those not familiar with this powerful concept, Chet Richards ought to be your first stop.] It is uncanny how perfectly it illustrates the power of the OODA loop.
This article does a masterful job describing the master class that the Patriots have been putting on how to exploit the OODA loop. If you appreciate Boyd's work, then you should root for the Patriots if only for the beauty of watching tempo being used to such great effect.
[As a postscript, one might ask "why don't other teams just do the same thing the Pats?" The reason why they haven't yet is because it is very hard. It helps to have a QB who has mastered the idea but it is useless without a team trained to do this. One couldn't just grab a bunch of conscripts and say "we're going to do maneuver warfare - go!" Shared orientation is built through shared experience, exercise and learning to create trust. One cannot simply will that into being, nor can one create it quickly.]
The Patriots run their no-huddle offense like no other team. They don’t necessarily start a quarter or a particular series with it. Tom Brady just steps on the gas when the time’s right.
While it may seem like he flips in-and-out of the hurry-up on a whim, there’s a method to the madness.
...Tempo and pace are the trademarks. The Pats have regular speed, faster speed and warp speed. Their purpose is to daze, confuse and exhaust opponents. Usually, it works like a charm.Classic signs of operating within an opponent's OODA loop. Changes occur faster than the opponent can process, causing them to fall behind. By the time they take action, it is too late; they are chasing ghosts.
So will the aging Ravens defense, on the field a ton the past two weeks, keep up with the “gimmick” offense, as linebacker Brendon Ayanbadejo tweeted in respect to the Patriots? Will they stay with the “borderline illegal” offense, as Jets linebacker Calvin Pace referred to the no-huddle in an ESPNNewYork.com story before the two teams met Thanksgiving night? Will the Ravens be so gassed they won’t be able to get back to the line, much less make a play on the regular snaps, as opposed to the quick snaps?If your opponent doesn't think what you're doing is fair, then that is a good sign for you. In war, you never want to be fair. In sports, you want as much advantage as you can squeeze from operating within the rules.
Even the younger Texans weren’t very good at handling the Pats’ up-tempo attack. During Sunday’s divisional round victory, by the third quarter Brady was playing them like puppets. On back-to-back plays, they weren’t set when the ball was snapped, caught when Brady rushed the team to the line. The first resulted in a 23-yard gain by Stevan Ridley to set up a first-and-goal from the 5. The ball was barely placed down when Brady once again hurried the team to the line for another quick snap and throw to Brandon Lloyd, who walked into the end zone before the Texans knew what hit them.
“You don’t know when you’re getting it. That makes it even harder,” ESPN analyst and former NFL quarterback Tim Hasselbeck said of the Pats’ hurry-up during a phone interview Monday. “When is that curveball coming? When is that changeup coming? When are we going to get it? Then you’ll get it when you have a personnel grouping out there that the Patriots want to attack.”Note that this isn't speed for speed's sake, nor is it about going fast all the time. If you aren't making better decisions than your opponent, operating fast will just cause you to make lots of bad choices. Furthermore, if you always operate at the same speed, then that provides a fixed target to which your opponent can adapt. Operating inside of an opponent's OODA loop is about modifying tempo to your advantage; using speed as a weapon to disorient your enemy. Or, in the words of an NFL commentator:
The NFL Network’s Solomon Wilcots, a sideline reporter for CBS on Saturday’s Ravens-Broncos telecast, believes the Pats use the no-huddle at strategic points, and it wears on teams mentally as well as physically.Mental dislocation. It is stressful. It makes it difficult to process information, making you more prone to errors. That's why you want to do it to your opponents.
“They do it in situations where they just made a big play. Now they want to run down there while you’re still trying to figure out what happened on that play, and guys are pointing fingers. Then they get up to the line and snap the ball,” Wilcots said. “Theirs is kind of situational. They speed it up at a moment of crisis or a moment of conflict or a moment of question, so it’s not just to tire another team. It’s to gain an advantage in terms of another team being discombobulated or whatever, maybe not quite organized.Note that tempo can be used to reinforce success.
“It’s like when a boxer hits you with a jab and you’re stunned. Then you come with a flurry,” Wilcots went on. “Well, they come with a flurry of plays. They’re controlling the game where psychologically, you can’t gather yourself. It can really cause more mental stress than physical stress.”
...Yet, Jaworski still doesn’t know when it’s coming.
“I have not found any trigger to when they decide to go to it,” he said. “They could be in the middle of a drive, and all of a sudden, there they go.”Again, patterns can be exploited by adaptive adversaries. If they can't predict what you will do, then that helps you operate inside their OODA loop to fold them back on themselves.
Jaworski then pointed to the win against Denver, when the Pats kept lead sack man Von Miller on the sideline a lot of the time because the Broncos weren’t able to substitute him back in while the Pats were in hurry-up mode. That’s another plus.Using tempo to shape adversary forces. When you find the enemy in a vulnerable position, use tempo to keep him in the vulnerable position.
Hasselbeck also made two interesting points. It’s hard for scout teams to emulate the kind of pace the Pats bring, and that creates a preparation problem. Second, like Jaworski, he can’t help but be impressed at how well Brady runs the operation, so quickly and seamlessly.Again, if adversary's can't train to it, then it is easier for the Pats to create novelty during the game to confuse and stress their adversary's decision-making.
“They have to do it in a manner that doesn’t alert (the other team) they’re going to do it and snap the ball right away,” Hasselbeck said. “To get that communicated to everybody, so that everybody operates with that same sense of urgency to get that snap off, it’s a fire drill, and then (to) not have mistakes off of it, that’s the other impressive end of it.A reminder that in order to fully exploit the strategic advantages of tempo, one's own forces need to be unified. They must operate with a sense of purpose and be able to rapidly adapt. Shared orientation and high motivation within your side helps you break your opponent's orientation and sap his will. If you can't get a good play off quickly, then you won't reap any strategic advantage from pushing the tempo. You'll just be making mistakes more quickly.
This article does a masterful job describing the master class that the Patriots have been putting on how to exploit the OODA loop. If you appreciate Boyd's work, then you should root for the Patriots if only for the beauty of watching tempo being used to such great effect.
[As a postscript, one might ask "why don't other teams just do the same thing the Pats?" The reason why they haven't yet is because it is very hard. It helps to have a QB who has mastered the idea but it is useless without a team trained to do this. One couldn't just grab a bunch of conscripts and say "we're going to do maneuver warfare - go!" Shared orientation is built through shared experience, exercise and learning to create trust. One cannot simply will that into being, nor can one create it quickly.]
